electronic voting systems

There are a variety of ways to electronically register, store, and process votes. In recent years older manual systems (paper ballots or mechanical voting machines) have been replaced in many areas with systems ranging from purely digital (touch screens) to hybrid systems where marked paper ballots are scanned and tabulated by machine. How-ever, voting systems have been subject to considerable con-troversy, particularly following the Florida debacle in the 2000 U.S. presidential election.

The criteria by which voting systems are evaluated include:

•  how easy it is for the voter to understand and use the system

•  accessibility for disabled persons

•  whether the voter’s intentions are accurately recorded

There are several types of electronic voting systems, such as this box that automatically tallies specially marked ballots. Common concerns include the potential for tampering and the need to provide for inde-pendent verification of results.  (Lisa McDonald/istockphoto)

•  the ability to make a permanent record of the vote

•  prevention of tampering (physical or electronic)

•  provisions for independent auditing of the votes in case of dispute

The degree to which a given system meets these criteria can vary considerably because of both design and imple-mentation issues.

Early Systems

The earliest form of voting system consisted of paper ballots marked and tabulated entirely by hand. The first generation of “automatic” voting systems involved mechanical voting machines (where votes were registered by pulling levers). Next came two types of hybrid systems where votes were cast mechanically but tabulated automatically. These sys-tems used punch cards (see punched cards and paper tape) or “marksense” or similar systems where the voter filled in little squares and the ballots were then scanned and tabulated automatically.

The ultraclose and highly disputed 2000 U.S. presiden-tial election “stress-tested” voting systems that most people had previously believed were reasonably accurate. The prin-cipal problems were the interpretation of punch cards that were not properly punched through (so-called dimpled or hanging chads) and the fact that some ballot layouts proved to be confusing or ambiguous. Two types of voting systems have been proposed as replacements for the problematic earlier technology.

Touchscreen

This type of system uses a screen display that can be directly manipulated by the voter (see touchscreen). In the most common type, called DRE (direct-recording elec-tronic), a computer program interprets and tabulates the vote as it is cast, storing an image in a removable memory unit and (usually) printing out a copy for backup. After vot-ing is complete, the memory module can be sent to the cen-tral counting office. (Alternatively, votes can be transmitted over a computer network in batches throughout the day.) In a few cases, voting has also been implemented through secure Internet sites.

Optical Scan

Concern about potential tampering with computers has led many jurisdictions to begin to replace touchscreen systems with optical-scan systems, where the voter marks a sturdy paper ballot. (About half of U.S. counties now use opti-cal-scan systems.) The advantage of optical systems is that the voter physically marks the ballot and can see how he or she has voted, and after tabulation the physical ballots are available for review in case of problems. However, opti-cal-scan ballots must be properly marked using the correct type of pencil, or they may not be read correctly. Unlike the touchscreen, it is not possible to give the voter immediate feedback so that any errors can be corrected. Optical-ballot systems may cost more because of paper and printing costs for the ballots, which may have to be prepared in several languages. However this cost may be offset by not having to develop or validate the more complicated software needed for all-electronic systems.

Whatever system is used, federal law requires that visu-ally or otherwise disabled persons be given the opportu-nity, wherever possible, to cast their own vote in privacy. With optical-scan ballots, this is accommodated with a spe-cial device that plays an audio file listing the candidates for each race, with the voter pressing a button to mark the choice. However, disability rights advocates have com-plained that existing systems still require that another per-son physically insert the marked ballot into the scanner. Touchscreen systems, however, with the aid of audio cues, can be used by visually disabled persons without the need for another person to be present. They are thus preferred by some advocates for the disabled.

Reforms and Issues

In response to the problems with the 2000 election, Con-gress passed the Help America Vote Act in 2002. Since then, the federal government has spent more than $3 billion to help states replace older voting systems—in many cases with touchscreen systems.

The biggest concern raised about electronic voting sys-tems is that they, like other computer systems, may be sus-ceptible to hacking or manipulation by dishonest officials. In 2007 teams of researchers at the University of Califor-nia–Davis were invited by the state to try to hack into its voting systems. For the test, the researchers were provided with full access to the source code and documentation for the systems, as well as physical access. The hacking teams were able to break into and compromise every type of vot-ing system tested. In their report, the researchers outlined what they claimed to be surprisingly weak electronic and physical security, including flaws that could allow hackers to introduce computer viruses and take over control of the systems.

Manufacturers and other defenders of the technology have argued that the testing was unrealistic and that real-world hackers would not have had nearly as much informa-tion about or access to the systems. (This may underestimate the resourcefulness of hackers, as shown with other sys-tems, such as the phone system and computer networks.)

Another issue is who will be responsible for indepen-dently reviewing the programming (source) code for each system to verify that it does not contain flaws. Manufactur-ers generally resist such review, considering the source code to be proprietary. (A possible alternative might be an open-source voting system. Advocates of open-source software argue that it is safer precisely because it is open to scrutiny and testing—see open-source movement.)

One common response to these security concerns is to require that all systems generate paper records that can be verified and audited. Some defenders of existing technol-ogy say that adding a parallel paper system is unnecessarily expensive and introduces other problems such as printer failures. They argue that all-electronic systems can be made safer and more secure, such as through the use of encryp-tion. (A proposed compromise would be for the machine to

print out a simple receipt with a code that the voter could use to verify online that the vote was tabulated.)

As of 2007, 28 states had passed laws requiring that vot-ing systems produce some sort of paper receipt or record that shows the voter what has been voted and that can be used later for an independent audit or recount,

Although control of elections is primarily a state or local responsibility, the federal government does have jurisdic-tion over elections for federal office. As a practical matter, any changes in voting technology or procedures mandated by Congress for federal elections will end up being used in local elections as well.

In 2007, congressional leaders decided not to require a major overhaul of the nation’s election systems until at least 2012. However, the inclusion of some sort of paper record is being mandated for the 2008 election. For users of touch-screen systems, the simplest way to accommodate this is to add small paper-spool printers, but some states have com-plained that their systems would require more-expensive accommodations.

Meanwhile, a lively debate continues in many states and other jurisdictions about how to meet the need for accessi-ble but secure voting systems without breaking the budget.